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ESSAY
The Dark Irony of International Water Rights
BRUCE PARDY ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a resolution that declared a human right to clean drinking water
and sanitation. 1 The resolution was approved by a vote of 122 to
none. 41 countries abstained, including the United States,
Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and
Japan. Delegates from abstaining countries said that consensus
was lacking, that the declaration was premature and in the
wrong forum, and that the meaning of such a right in
international law was uncertain. 2
These objections reflect only part of the dispute over
international rights to water. Yes, consensus is lacking, but what
is the nature of the disagreement? Yes, this particular resolution
may have been premature and in the wrong forum, given the
process underway at the Human Rights Council, but some
countries object regardless of the forum. Yes, the meaning of
∗ Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada. I would
like to thank my colleague Professor Darryl Robinson and Hugh Wilkins,
Managing Editor of the Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law, for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own.
Comments are welcome at pardyb@queensu.ca.
1. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. DOC.
A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/
Get?Open&DS=A/RES/64/292&Lang=E.
2. Press Release, U.N. Gen. Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Resolution
Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right by Recorded
Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions; Delegates Also Confirm
Nominee to Head Office of Internal Oversight Services, Elect Belarus to UNEP
Governing Council, U.N. DOC. GA/10967 (Jul. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10967.doc.htm.
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such a right is uncertain, but it is not just uncertainty that makes
it objectionable. Reluctance on the part of many countries is wellfounded. Simply put, an international right to water is a poor
idea – well motivated but badly conceived.
II. THE DARK IRONY OF INTERNATIONAL WATER
RIGHTS
International rights to water have a seductive appeal. The
argument goes like this: water is essential to life. Therefore,
people need access to water. Therefore, they should have a right
to be provided with an adequate supply. 3 Enshrining a right to
water in international law will enable them to get the water they
need. 4
The logic is flawed. The case for water rights is not
established simply from the fact that water is important and
access to water is a serious challenge in many countries. 5
International water rights do not address threats to the
availability of clean water – pollution, depletion, monopoly,
corruption, conflict of interest and mismanagement – and could
even exacerbate them. The dark irony of international water
rights is that they could frustrate the very objectives they are
intended to achieve.
The ideology underlying the campaign for water rights
contains two conflicting premises. The first is that governments
cannot be trusted to make clean water available. Therefore,
norms of international law must be brought to bear upon them.
An international right is the means whereby national
3. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water, in FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 93, 93 (Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds., 2005)
(“Humans need water. We are composed mostly of it and cannot live for more
than a few days without it. It seems almost axiomatic, therefore, that there
should be a human right to water.”).
4. Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 488
(1999) (“By acknowledging a human right to water and expressing the
willingness to meet this right for those currently deprived of it, the water
community would have a useful tool for addressing one of the most fundamental
failures of 20th century development.”).
5. The preamble to the General Assembly resolution notes that
approximately 884 million people do not have access to safe drinking water and
over 2.6 billion people lack basic sanitation. See G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 1.
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governments can be held accountable. The second premise is that
only governments can be trusted to deal with water, and certainly
the private sector cannot. 6 The nature of the proposed rights
implies that only governments may provide water, and therefore
must do so in the form of water monopolies. The possible
interpretations and implications of international water rights are
troubling.
III. THE MEANINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS
Proposals for international water rights tend to be
ambiguous. For example, consider the wording of the General
Assembly Resolution cited above: “the right to safe and clean
drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential
for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.” 7 General
Assembly resolutions do not create binding obligations per se, but
similar language in a treaty could have at least three competing
interpretations. It could mean (a) that some countries can compel
other countries to provide water and/or financial resources; (b)
that individual citizens can require their own governments to
provide water and sanitation; or (c) nothing in binding legal
terms.
These interpretations are vastly different but none of them
protect against actual threats to clean water, and indeed may
make them more acute.
A. An International Right to Water Could Mean That
Some Countries Can Compel Other Countries to
Provide Water and/or Financial Resources
A right, by definition, is held by some parties against other
parties. International treaties are made amongst countries. An
international right to water could establish rights and obligations
between countries rather than create enforceable rights that
6. See generally Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human
Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L. Q. 957, 973 (2004) (discussing government
regulation of private-sector activities that affect water quality and quantity).
7. G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 1.
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citizens hold against their own governments, despite wording
that implies a personal or “human” right to water.
From the perspective of wealthy or water-rich countries, the
risk of establishing international water rights is the risk of losing
sovereign control over their own resources. Governments failing
to provide access to clean water to their citizens could insist that
other countries supply them with water or with funding and
technology. 8 Freshwater resources could come to be regarded as
common global resources for the benefit of all humankind 9 rather
than natural resources under the sovereign control of nations,
giving credence to calls for international water transfers. 10 A
right to water could be interpreted as incorporating the principle
of equitable utilization of resources, which has already been
applied to freshwater flowing over borders, 11 as well as to other
natural resources such as biodiversity and the delimitation of the
continental shelf. 12 The Biodiversity Convention states that
countries are to share the benefits from development of
biodiversity resources “in a fair and equitable way.” 13 The same
Article states that countries continue to have sovereign rights
over their natural resources, but reference to fair and equitable
sharing raises the spectre of the argument that countries which
host biotechnology development are obligated to share profits or
rewards with other countries. 14

8. See Bluemel, supra note 6, at 998.
9. See generally Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic
and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1992).
10. See generally A. Daniel Tarlock, Water Transfers: A Means to Achieve
Sustainable Water Use, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 35
(Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds., 2005); Edith Brown Weiss, Water Transfers and
International Trade Law, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
61 (Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds., 2005).
11. David Freestone & Salman M.A. Salman, Ocean and Freshwater
Resources, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
337, 351 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
12. ELLI
LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS,
EFFECTIVENESS, AND WORLD ORDER 53-54 (2006).
13. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 15, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818
(1992).
14. Concerns of this nature have caused the United States to decline to ratify
the Convention. See LOUKA, supra note 12, at 54.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/6

4

06

5/1/2011 10:31 AM

PardyMacro

2011]

INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS

911

When freshwater is considered a national resource, the
country within which the water is located can exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over its fate. Water governance becomes more
complicated when rivers or lakes flow across national borders, 15
or where jurisdiction is shared between different levels of
government within a confederation of countries (e.g., the
European Union) or federations of provinces or states (e.g.,
Canada or the United States). But shared jurisdiction is simple
compared to the governance challenges created by transforming
freshwater resources into global common property.
No
government would be able to dictate the fate of freshwater found
within its borders. Arid countries could acquire legitimate claims
to a share of the resource. The tragedy of the commons 16 would
beckon.
As governments rushed in to get their shares, 17
protecting water resources could pose legal challenges similar to
those involved in protecting fish stocks in international waters or
attempting to fashion collective action against climate change,
which so far have proved to be insurmountable. International
water rights would have the practical effect of declaring open
season on national water resources. Contests between pressing
human need and long-term ecological protection would be
resolved in favour of the former, imperiling the long-term
viability of the resource for the host nation. National sovereign
control does not make protection of fresh water inevitable, but
does make it possible. The same cannot be said if water is
considered an international resource.
B. An International Right to Water Could Mean That
15. See generally Maria Manuela Farrajota, International Cooperation on
Water Resources, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 337
(Joseph W. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2009) .
16. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
17. Regrettably, wealth transfer may be the real motivation for some
governments to pursue an international right to water. One can see the intent
in the second paragraph of G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 1, which “[c]alls upon
States and international organizations to provide financial resources, capacitybuilding and technology transfer, through international assistance and
cooperation, in particular to developing countries, in order to scale up efforts to
provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for
all.” Id. Paying money to governments of developing countries is not the
revolution in governance that would provide greater access to clean water.
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Citizens Can Require Their Own Governments to
Provide Water and Sanitation
An international right to water might be worded in terms
that suggest citizens hold rights enforceable against their own
The declaration of individual rights in
governments. 18
international law, such as the right not to be arbitrarily
detained, 19 is no guarantee of enforceability. It is unclear what
mechanisms could or should be used to implement such rights. 20
Arguments in favor of free or inexpensive water seek to
relieve hardship for the poor. Free water for the poor is an
attractive proposition because it appears to solve a pressing need
in a single proclamation. However, an obligation on the part of
governments in arid countries to provide water for free would be
not merely counterproductive, but could actually make it
impossible to provide water for all. Consumption of anything,
including water, varies with price: lower price leads to higher
consumption. Where water is scarce, making it free or artificially
cheap exacerbates the scarcity because there is no incentive to
conserve. 21
The right to be provided with a government benefit, good or
service is a “positive right.”
Traditionally, domestic
constitutional rights are negative rights, such as the right to free
expression, to be presumed innocent, and to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. The essence of negative rights
is the right to be left alone, without intrusions from the state.
Governments can generally comply with negative rights by
18. See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating
Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. U. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 345-349, 354-356 (2005); see also Erik B. Bluemel, supra
note 6, at 963, 972-974.
19. See e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. DOC. A/RES/217(III), at art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. DOC. A/6316, at art. 9
(Dec. 16, 1966).
20. See generally Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International
Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and
Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (2004).
21. Clean Water is a Right But it Also Needs to Have a Price, ECONOMIST, Nov
9, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/node/8142904.
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inaction. Positive rights, in contrast, consist of entitlements that
governments must actively provide. 22 Positive rights reduce or
remove the economic incentive to produce goods and services.
Legislated ceilings on the price of housing, food or water mean
that producers of those goods make less money than the market
would otherwise return to them. Supply inevitably decreases.
While governments have an unlimited capacity to provide
negative rights, since they require merely that citizens be left
alone, positive rights require governments to take from some to
give to others. 23 While negative rights place limits on the state’s
ability to interfere, 24 positive rights do the opposite. 25
22. For example, the South African Constitution provides a right to housing,
health care, food, water, and social security. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 27.
In October 2009, South Africa’s Constitutional Court decided Mazibuko v. City of
Johannesburg, 2009 (3) SA 592 (CC) (S. Afr.). The applicants were five
residents of Phiri in Soweto. The City of Johannesburg, one of the respondents,
had established a policy of providing twenty-five liters of water per person, per
day for free. The applicants maintained that the policy offended Section 27 of
the Constitution. The trial court agreed, concluding that fifty liters of water was
the proper amount. The appellate court reduced this figure to forty-two liters.
On final appeal, the Constitutional Court found that Section 27 did not require
more free water than the city’s policy provided, and observed that courts were
ill-equipped to make such decisions. Id. at ¶ 62.
23. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 859
(2001).
24. See Court of Appeal, Jan. 27, 2011, Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen. of Bots.,
CACLB-074-10 (Bots), available at http://assets.survivalinternational.org/
documents/545/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf.
In
Mosetlhanyane the Botswana Court of Civil Appeals recognized the right of
Bushmen to use an old borehole to extract water for domestic purposes,
overturning a government prohibition. The case is likely to be interpreted as an
endorsement of the concept of a right to water, but that would not be an
accurate reading of the judgment. Instead, the court essentially found that the
Bushmen had the right not to be interfered with on the lands that they
rightfully occupied. Their right to use the borehole did not consist of a right to
be provided with water, or to have the government cover the expense of using
the borehole. The court stated:
[T]he appellants as lawful occupiers of the land in question merely
seek, at their own expense, permission to use water from a discarded
existing borehole for domestic purposes, something they had
admittedly been doing before. Indeed, it is not their case that they
should be granted a water right to abstract water ‘at will, in
unlimited quantities, from an unspecified number of boreholes.’ . . .
All that they need . . . is permission to use the existing or an
alternative borehole at their own expense and not Government’s
expense. . . . Lawful occupiers of land such as the appellants must be
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The case for free water rests on the argument that water is
essential to life, and therefore it should not carry a cost. But
providing water is costly, particularly in urban areas – for
regulating and enforcing watershed protection, for treating
polluted water, and for infrastructure to deliver clean water and
remove water waste. A right to free water does not eliminate the
cost of providing the water, but instead demands that it be paid
by others, such as through general taxes or fees on some other
commodity or service. By so doing, an international right to be
supplied with water incorporates a political ideology: water must
be provided by government rather than by private means, and the
costs of water systems cannot be borne by those who use them.
Positive rights to water demand a socialized system of water
provision, subsidized by some for the benefit of others. An
enforceable right of this nature would remove the democratic
right of citizens and countries to determine the ideological
premises of the water system they wish to run.
C. An International Right to Water Could be Merely
Symbolic, and Mean Nothing in Binding Legal
Terms
The history of international environmental law consists
largely of grand declarations and feeble delivery. 26 Multilateral
able to get underground water for domestic purposes, otherwise their
occupation would be rendered meaningless.
Id. at ¶ 16.
25. See generally Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 35 (1993).
26. For example, the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP
15) (held in Copenhagen in December 2009 under the 1992 UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change for the purpose of negotiating a follow-up treaty
to the Kyoto Protocol) ended in disarray and without agreement on even nonbinding, unenforceable greenhouse gas emission targets. The following session,
held in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010, concluded with a non-binding
political agreement that called upon developed countries to honour and increase
their commitments and developing countries to “take nationally appropriate
mitigation actions.” Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 29- Dec.
10, 2010, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (Decision 1/CP.16),
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, ¶ 48, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/
cop16/eng/07a01.pdf. After two decades of work on climate change, the prospect
for binding commitments on greenhouse gases is grim.
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agreements and resolutions often declare ambitious objectives but
lack meaningful enforcement or accountability mechanisms.
Rarely do they include sanctions such as trade measures to
ensure compliance, or provide for binding adjudication with the
ability to enforce judgments. Achievement of goals therefore
depends upon voluntary compliance of the parties at cost to
themselves, and at the risk of non-compliance of others. Not
surprisingly, countries rarely comply in such circumstances.
Instead, they act in their own national self-interest. This
behaviour is neither remarkable nor sinister. Instead, it is
precisely what one would expect from governments with
mandates to protect the welfare of their citizens.
A right to water that is unenforceable does not exist.
International agreements that proclaim such rights misrepresent
the state of the law. Even in international law, no right can be
relied upon in the absence of a remedy. Recognition exists for a
wide range of human rights, such as the right not to be
arbitrarily detained 27 or tortured, 28 but citizens in some countries
do not actually have such rights. If they did, arbitrary detention
and torture would not occur without consequence. Declaring
rights that do not carry binding obligations may be detrimental to
the purposes for which they are proclaimed. Citizens may be
duped into believing that they actually have the rights that are
declared, and that such declarations are necessary and sufficient
means of achieving them. Declaring a right to water confuses
legal norms with aspirations, and distracts attention from real
work that must be done at national and local levels to reform
governance.
Advocates of international water rights have characterized
their adoption as an essential first step towards reform. The
argument is that they express non-binding norms – statements of
what the international community regards as proper or

27. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 19, at art. 9; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
supra note 19, at art. 9.
28. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 19, at art. 5; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
supra note 19, at art. 7.
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desirable, 29 even if they are not compulsory. The expression of
the right provides a common goal and a standard against which
to measure the performance of national governments, even if
some fail to achieve these norms in practice. 30 Furthermore,
where a domestic statute is ambiguous, domestic courts may refer
to values and principles enshrined in international law to
interpret the meaning of the legislation. 31
The value credited to symbolic declarations is misplaced.
Their role as important first steps is not supported by the history
of international environmental law, which is littered with
beginnings that did not lead to concrete measures. 32 In dualist
states, the expression of an international right does not create a
right in domestic law, 33 and domestic statutes prevail in cases of
conflict with international law. 34 Purely symbolic rights are as
likely to relieve pressure upon governments as to increase it.

29. John G. Merrills, Environmental Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 663, 666 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds,,
2007).
30. See Gleick, supra note 4, at 489, stating:
What is the value of explicitly acknowledging a human right to
water, as the international community has explicitly acknowledged a
human right to food and to life? After all, despite the declaration of a
formal right to food, nearly a billion people remain undernourished.
One reason is to encourage the international community and
individual governments to renew their efforts to meet basic water
needs of their populations. International discussion of the necessity
of meeting this basic need for all humans is extremely important – it
raises issues that are global but often ignored on the national or
regional level. Secondly, by acknowledging such a right, pressure to
translate that right into specific national and international legal
obligations and responsibilities is much more likely to occur.
31. See, e.g., R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, ¶¶ 53-56 (Can.); 114957 Canada
Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Town of Hudson, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶¶
30-32 (Can.); Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
2 S.C.R. 817, ¶ 70 (Can.); R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, ¶ 127 (Can).
32. The notable exception is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
33. See e.g. R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (Can.); Baker v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (Can.); Capital Cities
Commc’ns Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm’n [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (Can.);
Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 618 (Can.).
34. RUTH SULLIVAN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 130 (1997).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/6

10

06

5/1/2011 10:31 AM

PardyMacro

2011]

INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS

917

IV. ALTERNATIVES
While it is doubtful that international rights to water would
help increase access to, or improve protection of water resources,
an alternative roster of rights could be effective if it were to
address real threats to water resources, such as pollution,
depletion, monopoly, corruption, conflict of interest and
mismanagement. Access to clean water calls for a system of laws
and responsibilities with the same features as those governing
any other important matter: compliance with basic principles of
the rule of law and democratic accountability, protection of
citizens from the interference of others (including those who
would pollute water and other common environmental resources),
and protection of citizens’ access to goods and services by means
of competitive markets and freedom to choose. The rationale for
rights is not simply that water is important, but that the main
threats to water can be alleviated by establishing certain
principles for the way it is governed.
Clean water is a commodity. While some can sink a well or
throw a bucket into the local stream, in urban areas water must
be collected, treated and delivered. Should water be free because
it is essential and therefore priceless, or should it be expensive
because it is essential and therefore valuable? The attempt to
identify an abstract value for water is based on flawed premises.
The proper price for any commodity depends upon supply and
demand. The classic example is diamonds, which have little
utility but are very expensive due to their scarcity.
No
justification exists for rights to be supplied with goods that are
otherwise subject to competitive markets, such as food or housing,
because the competitive market itself protects consumers from
rigged prices, false shortages and inefficiency. Any attempt by a
seller of such goods to abuse customers would result in lost
customers and improved business for the seller’s competitors.
The only ‘citizens’ rights’ necessary with respect to such goods
would be the negative right to be free from government
intervention in the market, so as to prevent nationalization or
monopolization from destroying the dynamics of competition. 35
35. People who are extremely poor have difficulty acquiring necessities such
as water, food and shelter from competitive markets because they cannot afford
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Maintaining a competitive market for the delivery of water in
urban areas is challenging. Building more than one set of pipes
underground is rarely feasible. Water delivery systems are
commonly run as natural monopolies, and therefore are not
subject to market forces. 36 When only a single system of
treatment and supply operates in an urban area, no competition
is available to set a market price. Monopolies restrict water
access by dictating terms. Urban residents can obtain only the
water that the monopoly supplies, whatever the quality, and
must pay whatever price the utility demands. Even natural
monopolies do not work well, regardless of whether the monopoly
is public or private. They tend to be inefficient and unresponsive
to their customers. They may charge high prices because there is
no competition to set a market price, or low prices because there
is political pressure to do so. Neither outcome is appropriate.
Public-private partnerships are vulnerable to having all the
disadvantages of public and private monopolies – unrestrained
profit-taking, inefficient management, use of public monies for
private purposes, and little or no recourse for the citizen
customer.
Where monopoly exists, legislating citizen rights may be
necessary to counterbalance the monopoly’s market power. The
freedom to contract is meaningless where a monopoly is the
legislated source of an essential good.
Monopolized water
utilities, even when created by statute and subject to political
supervision, cannot be expected to be responsive to customer
demands or the discipline of competitive markets if their
customers have no legal right to require the utility to meet
certain price, service or quality standards. If there is no market
to set price, legislated rules should require price to reflect cost of
to pay even competitive prices. But the existence of poverty is not evidence of
systemic flaws with the supply of these goods. If stores are full of bread, the fact
that a hungry man on the street has no money does not indicate that the price of
bread is too high, or that the system of food production requires reform.
Instead, it suggests the need for a social safety net to provide the poor with
resources to buy bread from the store. If the poorest people do not have money
to pay for water, that is a problem attributable to poverty, not to a problem with
water governance.
36. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Markets for Water: Time to Put the Myth to
Rest?, 131 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 33 (2005).
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provision and scarcity, getting as close as possible to reproducing
the dynamics of supply and demand. Regulation should be armslength – the operation of water treatment plants and pipelines
should be separate from the supervision of the system, which in
turn should be separate from the setting of standards that the
system is expected to meet. Only in this way is it possible to
avoid conflicts of interest within the various arms of government
that are empowered to control water. 37
The better approach is to not monopolize water. 38 It may not
be practical to build multiple sets of pipes underneath urban
areas, but that does not mean that competition in treatment or
delivery is not possible. 39 Furthermore, where settlement is rural
and people obtain their water via their own private or village
wells, there is no rationale for monopoly.
37. See Bruce Pardy, Myths and Legends, 9 CANADIAN WATER TREATMENT 7, 8
(Nov.-Dec., 2009), stating:
If those who set the standards also have the job of achieving the
standards, then they will set standards that are within their
capacity to meet even if that means water of questionable quality. If
those who enforce standards also operate facilities, then enforcement
will be lax or non-existent. These different functions should ideally
be carried out by different levels of government; or, at the very least,
by different government agencies willing to censure each other.
38. See ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, LIQUID ASSETS: PRIVATIZING AND REGULATING
CANADA’S WATER UTILITIES 147 (2002), stating:
In the best of all possible worlds, consumers would choose their
water from a number of suppliers offering different qualities,
services, and prices. Industrial consumers could reduce their costs by
choosing interruptible supplies or less treated water. Residential
consumers could choose untreated water for their gardens and, for
their personal use, could satisfy their preferences regarding taste
and health concerns.
The choice between fluoridated and
unfluoridated water, or between chlorinated water and that
disinfected by other means, would be made by individual households
- or, at least, neighbourhoods - rather than city officials.
39. For example, competition in water and sewer services has been
introduced in Scotland under the Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act, 2005,
(A.S.P. 3), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2005/
asp_20050003_en_3. The Act authorizes the licensing of firms to enter into
contracts for the supply of water and/or sewerage to particular premises. The
Water Industry Commission for Scotland claims to have developed a framework
for water competition that allows customers to choose a supplier on the basis of
service and cost.
See Competition, WATER INDUS. COMM’N FOR SCOT.,
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_Competition.aspx (last visited Mar. 10,
2011).
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When water is captured, it becomes a private good. Before
capture, it is a common resource, flowing underground and in
surface bodies towards the ocean. Governments have a legitimate
role to play, protecting both quality and quantity, so that there is
clean water available for the taking. This role is as protector, not
provider. All that is called for is to prevent pollution and
depletion – not to actively provide water, but to protect the
resource from interference from those who would impose
environmental externalities upon it.
V. CONCLUSION
Good water governance requires good governance, broadly
conceived.
International water rights do not achieve this
objective, and are likely to threaten the enterprise of protecting
water resources.
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